

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04414 01 OF 03 290833Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 290755Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8609
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PRETORIA 4414

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, UK, RH
SUBJECT: RHODESIA PROPOSALS: TALKS WITH FRONT LINE LEADERS

REF: (A) LUSAKA 2571, (B) LUSAKA 2572,

1. THE BRITISH PROVIDED US WITH A COPY OF THEIR TELEGRAM REPORTING THE PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, WITH THE FRONT LINE LEADERS. EARLIER SUMMARY OF THIS SAME MEETING IS CONTAINED IN REF (B).

2. AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAS REVIEWED THE BRITISH ACCOUNT OF THIS CONVERSATION AND WOULD ADD ONLY THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WHICH WE HAVE ALSO SHOWED TO DAVID OWEN.

3. BEGIN TEXT: TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID, "WE CAN NO LONGER ARGUE THIS QUESTION. WE ARE EITHER FOR YOU OR AGAINST YOU. WE ARE AGREED ON OUR OBJECTIVES. OUR PEOPLE AT THE UN CAN WORK OUT THE DETAILS."
END TEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04414 01 OF 03 290833Z

4. COMMENT: BOTH OWEN AND YOUNG AGREE THAT THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ACCEPTED NYERERE'S STATEMENT AS REPRESENTING THE CONSENSUS OF THE FRONT LINE PARTICIPANTS.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE BRITISH MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

BEGIN TEXT

THE FRONT LINE PRESENTS: STATE HOUSE, LUSAKA
ON 27 AUGUST 1977

DR. OWEN SAID THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAS STARTED THE PRIVATE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THERE WAS MORE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN READ OUT PARAGRAPH 11 (E) OF THE PROPOSALS AND THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF 11 (C) (ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS REPRESENTATIVE). HE THEN REPEATED A FORMULATION WHICH HE HAD EXPLORED WITH MR. CHISSANO OVER LUNCH ABOUT THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY. HE HAD SAID THAT ENROLLMENT WOULD BE OPEN TO ANY CITIZEN WISHING TO LIVE ON IN THE FUTURE ZIMBABWE, THAT THE ARMY WOULD BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION ARMY, THAT IT SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES WHO WOULD BE LOYAL TO ZIMBABWE AND THAT ITS COMPOSITION SHOULD BE SUCH IT WOULD BE ACCAPTABLE TO THE MAN WHO WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF ZIMBABWE, WHOEVER THAT MIGHT BE. DR. OWEN THEN OUTLINED THE PROBLEM, DISTINGUISHING THE AIR FORCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF DIFFICULTY WHICH HAD TO BE FACED. SURELY NO PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TOTALLY TO DISMANTLE THE EXISTING AIR FORCE WHEN THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF PUTTING ANYTHING IN ITS PLACE.

PRESIDENT MACHEL SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRETOR 04414 01 OF 03 290833Z

AND BRITAIN FACED SEPARATE PROBLEMS. BRITAIN SAW THE WHITES AS BEING THEIR PROBLEM WHEREAS THEY SAW THE BLACKS AS BEING THEIR PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT PRHAPS BRITAIN SHOULD BE WORRYING MORE ABOUT THE BLACKS AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS MORE ABOUT THE WHITES. WHY HAD DR. OWEN NOT TALKED AT ALL ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF ZANU AND ZAPU? PRESIDENT MACHEL THEN SPOKE QUITE OPENLY ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WHITE EXODUS FROM RHODESIA. HE GAVE A LONG DESCRIPTION ABOUT THE DANGER THAT WE WOULD FACE FROM BLACKS IN THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES, CITING MOZAMBIQUE EXPERIENCE. THEY WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE WHITE ELEMENTS, FOR IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THEIR FUTURE LAY WITH THE GUERRILLAS THEY COULD EASILY JOIN UP WITH THEM AND TURN AGAINST THE WHITES. DR. OWEN AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND POINTED OUT THAT SOME SENSIBLE RHODESIANS BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF THE DISMANTLING OF THE EXISTING FORCES IF THIS TOOK PLACE TOO RAPIDLY AND THERE WAS A PARTICULAR NEED TO KEEP THE WHITE COMPANY COMMANDERS WHO HAD THE LOYALTY OF THE BLACKS DURING THE DEMOBILISATION AND RESETTLEMENT PROCESS. PRESIDENT

MACHEL UNDERSTOOD THIS.

THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO PUBLICATION OF OUR PROPOSALS. DR. OWEN SAID THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS READY FOR PUBLICATION. HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS A COPY NOW BUT THAT WOULD PROBABLY MEAN HAVING TO GIVE ONE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TOO AND HE WOULD FIND ANY QUOTATIONS IN THE NEWSPAPERS PRIOR TO THURSDAY VERY EMBARRASSING. NODOBY THEN ASKED FOR THE DOCUMENT AND THERE SEEMED FROM THE SILENCE TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IF IT WAS GIVEN TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IT WOULD LEAK TO THE PRESS. PRESIENT NYERERE ASKED WHETHER PUBLICATION COULD BE POSTPONED. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04414 02 OF 03 290857Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PRETORIA 4414

EXDIS

FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN A POSITION WHERE THEY WERE OBLIGED TO ATTACK OUR PROPOSALS. DR. OWEN HOPED THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSE TO DO SO ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT WISH TO INTERPRET PARTS OF IT IN THEIR OWN WAY. HE SAID THAT MR. SMITH WAS LIKELY INSTANTLY TO REJECT THE PROPOSALS. IT WOULD BE A BAD THING IF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS REJECTED THEM AT THE SAME TIME. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THEY SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE UN REPRESENTATIVE BEING AUTHORISED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PARAGRAPH 11 (E). THEY WOULD SET OUT THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF THE AIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY AS NECESSARY. HE HOPED THAT IN DOING SO THEY WOULD SAY NO MORE THAN THAT THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL

ARMY SHOULD BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION ARMY AND REQUIRE THAT IT MUST BE NEUTRAL AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY COULD INDICATE THAT IT NEED NOT EXCLUDE ACCEPTABLE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG THEN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF DISARMING BOTH SIDES IN THE CONFLICT. PRESIDENT MACHEL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04414 02 OF 03 290857Z

SAID THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. THE GUERRILLAS WERE ALREADY IN RHODESIA. HOW WOULD YOU GO ABOUT DISARMING THEM? IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THEM TO LEAVE RHODESIA AND THEN DISARM. DR. OWEN SAID THAT NUTS AND BOLTS ISSUES OF THIS KIND OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSED. PRESIDENT NYERERE AGREED AND INVITED HIM TO TELL THE GROUP ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON TRANSFER DAY. DR. OWEN THEN DESCRIBED THE SITUATION ON TRANSFER DAY AND THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH MEN WHO WOULD BE UNDER ARMS AND STILL FIGHTING UP TO THE MOMENT OF CEASE FIRE. HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO TO MUCH DETAIL BUT HE SAID AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY WE WOULD APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF 11 (C) WE HAD FORMED SOME IDEAS BUT HE DID NOT WISH TO PUBLISH THEM AS FIRM PROPOSALS. HE READ OUT PARAGRAPHS 6-14 INCLUSIVE OF THE AGREED ANGLO/US DOCUMENT ON LAW AND ORDER AND THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE DID NOT MENTION THE GREY SCOUTS (PARAGRAPH 7) OR USE THE WORD PREDOMINANTLY (PARA 12) WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED SHOULD BE DELETED. IN PARAGRAPH 14 HE HAD CHANGED THE WORDING AS HE READ IT OUT AND HAD SAID THAT THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD INCREASINGLY USE THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY AND FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY AND LAW AND ORDER. THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS DID NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THE LAW AND ORDER PAPER AND DR. OWEN TOOK THE FACT THAT THEY RAISED NO OBJECTION AS INDICATING A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH THE APPROACH. THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ASKED WHAT VIEW NKOMO AND MUGABE HAD TAKEN OF THE PROPOSALS. DR. OWEN REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH NKOMO AND HAD FOUND HIM VERY REALISTIC. HE HAD NOT HAD THE SAME OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO MUGABE. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE RHODESIAN MILITARY. DR. OWEN SAID THAT ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE ROOM HAD THEIR CONTACTS AND INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 PRETOR 04414 02 OF 03 290857Z

AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA PROBABLY KNEW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES THAN HE DID. BUT OUR INFORMATION

POINTED PERSISTENTLY AND STEADILY TO THE FACT THAT THE RHODESIAN MILITARY RECOGNIZED THAT THEY COULD NOT ULTIMATELY WIN THE WAR. PRESIDENT KAUNDA KNEW ONLY TOO WELL THE THREAT TO ZAMBIA FROM RHODESIA. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE RHODESIAN MILITARY HAD CONTROLLED SOME OF THE WILDER ELEMENTS IN THE SMITH CABINET ALTHOUGH SMITH'S OWN ATTITUDE WAS NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. PRESIDENT MACHEL COMMENTED THAT HIS EXPERIENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE HAD BEEN SIMILAR. THE MILITARY WERE THE FIRST TO REALISTICALLY FACE THE SITUATION.

DR. OWEN POINTED OUT THAT MANY OF THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES WISHED TO GO ON LIVING IN RHODESIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THEY MIGHT BE REALISTIC BUT THEY WERE NOT, AS PRESIDENT MACHEL ACCEPTED, YET A DEFEATED ARMY. PRESIDENT KAUNDA INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ATTACK FROM THE AIR BY RHODESIA ON ZAMBIA BETWEEN 28 AUGUST AND 7 SEPTEMBER. DR. OWEN SAID THAT THIS EMPHASIZED THE FEARS HE HAD EXPRESSED ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA REMARKED THAT, DESPITE DR. OWEN'S COMMENTS ON THE RHODESIAN MILITARY BEING MODERATE, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A STATEMENT MADE IN SALISBURY ACCUSING HIM OF MASSING TROOPS ON THE RHODESIAN/ZAMBIA BORDER. HE WAS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN ZAMBIA AND COULD SAY CATEGORICALLY THAT HE WAS DOING NO SUCH THING.

DR. OWEN TOLD THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS THAT MR. BOTHA'S RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN THAT THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY SERIOUS AND CONSIDERABLY BETTER THAN HE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE BY MR. SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THEM. BUT SOUTH AFRICA TOO HAD HER WORRIES ABOUT LAW AND ORDER AND COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE SOME ASSURANCE ON THESE MATTERS TO THE WHITES IN RHODESIA WHO COULD MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PRETOR 04414 02 OF 03 290857Z

AMBASSADOR YOUNG DESCRIBED THE DIFFERENT PRESSURES THAT COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME, IN PARTICULAR COMMERCIAL PRESSURES THAT WERE ALREADY BUILDING UP FROM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. DR. OWEN SAID THAT THERE WAS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF COUNTRIES, SOME OF WHOM HAD HITHERTO HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHO WOULD SUPPORT THE PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION IRAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 PRETOR 04414 03 OF 03 290902Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 PRETORIA 4414

EXDIS

DR. OWEN ASKED THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS WHETHER THE
SO-CALLED FOURTH FORCE IN TANZANIA EXISTED. PRESIDENT
NYERERE BEGAN TO TALK ABOUT IT BUT PRESIDENT MACHEL INTERRUPTED
TO SAY THAT 4-5,000 PEOPLE HAD BEEN SHIPPED
FROM MOZAMBIQUE TO TANZANIA. THESE COULD FORM THE BASIS
OF A NEUTRAL ARMY AND WOULD HAVE A UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE.
ONE OF THE PRESIDENTS POINTED OUT THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE
ACCEPTABLE TO SELECT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS FROM THE RHODESIAN
DEFENCE FORCE WHO MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL
ARMY, IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO SELECT IN THIS WAY
FROM THE FOURTH FORCE. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED
AS A GROUP WHO HAD ALREADY BEEN SELECTED. PRESIDENT NYERERE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOURTH FORCE WAS NOT "HIS" ARMY.
DR. OWEN SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ROLE
OF THE FOURTH FORCE SHOULD BE OPENED UP PUBLICLY SO THAT IT
MIGHT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WOULD PLAY A GENUINE NEUTRAL
ROLE.

IN DESCRIBING THE HANDLING OF PUBLICATION OF THE
BRITISH PROPOSALS, DR. OWEN SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04414 03 OF 03 290902Z

A SLAP IN THE FACE. THEY WOULD BE DUBBED AS NAIVE, ETC.
SMITH WOULD PROBABLY REJECT THEM AND TRY TO COBBLE UP AN
INTERNAL SETTLEMENT INVOLVING EITHER MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE.
HIS OWN HUNCH WAS THAT NEITHER WOULD GO ALONG WITH
SUCH AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IF THEY DID NOT GO ALONG

WITH AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, SMITH WOULD NOT BE THE
PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED. THE TWO
CRUCIAL FACTORS WOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
OF THE RHODESIAN DEFENSE FORCES AND THEIR COMMANDERS.
BRITAIN WOULD GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WOULD BE VERY
HELPFUL IF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS COULD EXPRESS THEIR
OWN QUALIFICATIONS ABOUT OUR PROPOSALS IN A MODERATE WAY
SO THAT THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RESIDENT
COMMISSIONER DESIGNATE, THE UN REPRESENTATIVE, A SPOKESMAN
FOR THE LIBERATION ARMY AND THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCE
COULD TAKE PLACE. ONLY WHEN WE KNEW THE DETAILED RESULTS
OF THIS COULD THE SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISH THE UN FORCE
AND AGREE ITS MANDATE PARTY. ONLY THEN COULD THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT PASS ON ORDER ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION.
END TEXT.
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